We present controlled experimental evidence on how corruption affects the private provision of public goods. Subjects in our experiment donate to non-profit associations. The associations provide local public goods that benefit all subjects. We compare average contributions between two conditions with the same efficiency: a corruption condition, where an administrator can expropriate part of contributions, and a control condition without corruption. Compared to the control condition, subjects matched to an expropriating administrator significantly reduce their contributions. Hence, contributors are less inclined to behave prosocially (i.e. are more likely to free-ride) if they are exposed to corruption. We demonstrate that this effect works through a specific channel: corruption breaks the otherwise positive link between baseline preferences for cooperation and private contributions to public goods.
Introduction
Economists tend to agree that corruption has severe negative consequences for society: it has been shown that corruption decreases private investment (Mauro, 1995; Campos et al., 1999; Wei, 2000; Beekman et al., 2014) and that the misuse of public funds for private gain deprives citizens of vital public services (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004, 2005; Olken, 2006 Olken, , 2007 . Beyond these well-known effects, a recent literature suggests that the presence of corrupt leaders adversely affects a much broader set of outcomes, including the type of behavior individuals show when interacting with their fellow citizens. For instance, research in psychology has demonstrated that group leaders' procedural fairness promotes cooperation among group members (De Cremer and Van Knippenberg, 2002) . Similarly, recent experimental evidence from economics shows that free-riding behavior is diminished if elected authorities lead by example (Kelsey Jack and Recalde, 2015) and that framing past experiences in an ultimatum game as bribery erodes trust in others (Banerjee, 2016) . 1 In this paper, we test whether the exposure to a rent-extracting administrator affects the private provision of public goods. 2 The question how voluntary contributions to public goods respond to corruption is of vital importance. This is because public goods can be provided by the state, or through private contribution schemes. In the case of corruption, the provision of public goods by the state shrinks mechanically, as the misuse of public funds by state officials leaves citizens with fewer public goods in exchange for their tax money. Whether citizens are equipped with the socially desirable level of public goods thus depends on the response of private provision. If corruption leads to lower private contributions, it is likely that citizens will face a severe underprovision with respect to the overall level of public goods.
The effect of corruption on voluntary contributions could work through two dif-1 There is an older line of reasoning in political economy maintaining that autocratic power of executives and elite capture lead to low levels of interpersonal trust and civic participation, sometimes labeled as "social capital" (Putnam, 1993; Knack and Keefer, 1997) . However, instead of identifying causal effects, this literature has mainly pointed to correlations in survey-based data. 2 The focus on the consequences of corruption in the form of rent extraction differentiates our work from the existing experimental literature on corruption (e.g. Frank and Schulze, 2000; Abbink et al., 2002; Barr and Serra, 2009; Cameron et al., 2009; Abbink and Serra, 2012) . These studies mainly focus on corruption in the form of bribery and investigate agents' motivation to engage in or punish corruption. ferent channels. First, if corrupt officials are involved in transforming private contributions into public goods, rent extraction reduces the efficiency of public goods provision. We call this the efficiency effect.
3 More specifically, corruption decreases the marginal per capita return from contributing to the public good. Of course, this efficiency loss lowers the incentives for community members to contribute to private provision schemes. Second, corruption might erode individuals' contributions to the private provision of public goods through a motivational effect that goes beyond the efficiency effect. This effect might be explained by well-known concepts such as selfserving believes (corruption might strengthen the belief that the society lacks prosocial attitudes), reciprocity (individuals reduce contributions to decrease bureaucrats' rents from extraction), or betrayal aversion (individuals lower contributions to limit the potential to be betrayed).
4
While the efficiency effect of corruption in the context of voluntary contribution mechanisms is important and interesting in its own right, it is also very similar in nature to the effect of the marginal per-capita return that has been extensively studied in the context of the public goods game (for an early survey, see Ledyard (1995) ). In contrast, the pure motivational impact of corruption on private contributions, i.e. the effect remaining once we control for the efficiency effect, has rarely been studied empirically and is therefore not well understood.
As suggested by the previous literature, we expect the motivational effect of corruption on contribution behavior to be negative. Data from the World Values Survey (WVS) displayed in Figure 1 confirm this expectation. The figure plots the percentage of respondents who contribute to the private provision of public goods by volunteering for civic organizations. Among individuals who believe that corruption within their country's government is low, almost 38% identify themselves as contributors. In contrast, among individuals who perceive corruption to be high, the share of contributors 3 Previous research on developing countries has indeed shown that corruption often takes the form of local chiefs expropriating (part of) households' contributions to communal public goods (Acemoglu et al., 2014; Beekman et al., 2014) . Such contributions are often partly voluntary, which differentiates them conceptually from taxes used to finance public goods provided by the state. 4 Di Tella and Pérez-Truglia (2015) introduce the concept of self-serving beliefs. Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) formalize the idea of reciprocity, and Fehr and Gächter (2000) and Falk (2007) show that individuals indeed behave reciprocal. Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004) , Bohnet et al. (2008) and Cubitt et al. (2015) discuss betrayal aversion in the context of investment decisions under risk.
is less than 27%.
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While the WVS evidence is interesting, it only shows a raw correlation. To identify the motivational effect of corruption on voluntary contributions, we therefore implement a controlled laboratory experiment. In the experiment, we observe subjects' one-shot contributions (out of a private endowment) to certain non-profit associations operating outside the laboratory. We identify the effect of corruption on voluntary contributions by comparing contributions in a corruption condition, where an administrator decides whether or not to expropriate a fixed share of contributions, to a control condition without active expropriation. As we want to study the pure motivational impact of corruption, we ensure that the transformation of contributions into public goods is equally efficient in both conditions. To that end, we adjust the efficiency in the control condition to match the efficiency in the corruption condition. This is achieved by means of a random draw that determines for each administrator in the control condition whether or not she receives the same fixed share of contributions as an expropriating administrator in the corruption condition.
Our main findings are as follows. First, we find that subjects matched to an expropriating administrator in the corruption condition contribute much less to public goods provision than subjects in the control condition. The effect is substantial: in our setting, being exposed to a corrupt administrator causes a 31% reduction in contributions. As our design shuts down the efficiency channel, the experiment identifies the pure motivational effect of corruption: contributors are less inclined to behave prosocially (and are more likely to free-ride) if they are exposed to corruption taking the form of an active expropriation decision by an administrator. Second, we use survey data elicited after the experiment to identify cooperative and non-cooperative contributor types. Importantly, the survey questions elicit baseline attitudes towards cooperation, independent from our experimental design. We study whether individuals' responses to corruption in the experiment differ between different types with 5 It seems justified to assume that government corruption does not affect how much public goods voluntary organizations can provide from one hour of unpaid volunteer work. Hence, a direct efficiency effect of government corruption on the private provision of public goods is unlikely to drive the correlation in Figure 1 . In other contexts, it is often difficult to differentiate between efficiency effects and pure motivational effects. See, for instance, OECD (2013), discussing a negative correlation between government corruption and subjective measures of tax compliance. respect to baseline preferences for cooperation. We find that without corruption, noncooperative types make lower contributions than cooperative types. However, whereas non-cooperative types do not react to corruption, cooperative types reduce their contribution to the level of non-cooperative types in the presence of expropriating administrators. This finding suggests that the overall effect of corruption on voluntary contributions works through a specific channel: the presence of corrupt administrators breaks the otherwise positive link between baseline preferences for cooperation and actual cooperative behavior.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our research design, Section 3 describes our main findings, and Section 4 concludes.
Experimental Design
Private Provision of Public Goods in the Experiment We investigate the effect of corruption on voluntary contributions to public goods in a laboratory experiment. In our experiment, we adapt a widely-used experimental design that studies contributions to a naturally occurring public good by eliciting choices in a modified dictator game (Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Benz and Meier, 2008; de Oliveira et al., 2011; Voors et al., 2012) . 6 Specifically, subjects in the experiment make contributions to non-profit associations, which use the funds to provide real public goods to the population from which subjects are drawn. We achieve this as follows: we conduct the experiment with students enrolled at the department of economics and business administration at the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg. In the experiment, we provide subjects with an endowment which they can either keep for themselves or contribute to one of the various non-profit associations (mostly run by students) operating at the department. The associations offer a broad range of services, including placement into international exchange programs, students workshops, tutoring services, and counseling for students. The associations also participate in the organization of various social events at the department throughout the academic year.
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Treatment Conditions The experiment consists of a simple one-shot game. To identify the effect of corruption on contribution behavior, we implement two treatment conditions: a corruption condition and a control condition. In both conditions, we randomly determine subjects' player type, either contributor or administrator. In addition,
we randomly allocate subjects to groups, each group comprising three contributors and one administrator. Both types of players receive a fixed endowment of 100 experimental currency units (ECU), which equals 10 Euro. Furthermore, both conditions consist of two stages. Figure 2 summarizes the timing of our experimental design.
In the first stage of the corruption condition, each contributor selects one out of five associations to which she can contribute an amount between 0 and 100 ECU in the second stage. The instructions list the associations by name and inform subjects about the associations' main activities. For instance, the international student association AIESEC is introduced as ' AIESEC: Placement for international exchanges and internships and corresponding counseling services; intercultural tutoring'. While contributors select an association, each administrator makes a binary choice of whether or not to expropriate a fixed share of 10% of the second-stage contributions in her group.
Administrators who decide for expropriation know that this increases their payoff by 0 to 30 ECU, depending on the second-stage contributions. We do not inform administrators about which associations contributors in their group select. Hence, administrators cannot condition their expropriation decision on which associations benefit from contributions. In the second stage, contributors learn about their administrator's decision (expropriation of 10% of contributions, or no expropriation) before they decide how much to contribute to the previously chosen association. Note that the game does not involve any interaction between contributors.
The control condition differs from the corruption condition in that the first stage does not involve any active decision-making by administrators. Instead of deciding for or against expropriation, administrators in the control condition are informed about the outcome of a random draw that determines whether or not they receive 10% of the second-stage contributions in their group. In the experiment, we use the label 'additional compensation' for this part of administrators' payoff. We choose the probability for the random draw to be equal to the empirical propensity of administrators choosing expropriation in the corruption condition. Importantly, we neither communicate the exact probability nor mention that the probability depends on the behavior of administrators in another condition. The random draw in the control condition ensures that the efficiency of public goods provision, i.e. the amount received by associations per ECU contributed, is equal between conditions. In the second stage, contributors in the control condition learn about the outcome of the random draw for their administrator before they make their contribution decision.
Further Details of the Design Three further details of our experimental design are worth noting. First, grouping together three contributors with one administrator does not change the monetary incentive for making a contribution. We nevertheless assign individuals into groups of four players to ensure that, despite the moderate expropriation rate, our design implements substantial monetary incentives for administrators to opt for expropriation. Second, administrators and contributors make their decisions knowing that the experimenter doubles transfers to associations. 8 This ensures that contributions to the same associations would be less efficient in terms of public goods provision if contributors made them outside the laboratory. Third, administrators perform a simple administrative task after contributors make their contribution decisions.
Specifically, administrators have to assign contributions to associations according to contributors' choices. 9 The only purpose of this element of the design is to ensure that the role administrators perform in the experiment is consistent with the function implied by the 'administrator' label.
Identification of the Effect of Corruption Our design generates observations from
groups where the administrator benefits from contributions (through the expropriation decision or the random draw), and from groups where this is not the case. We derive our results exclusively from studying contributors who interact with administrators who do benefit from contributions. Contributors from the remaining groups experience a situation where administrators do not interfere with public goods provision, and are thus of no particular use for our study. Hence, we identify the effect of corruption from comparing contributors who were matched to an expropriating administrator (corruption condition) to contributors who were matched to an administrator receiving the additional compensation (control condition).
Importantly, because the share of contributions accruing to administrators is equal in both conditions, this comparison involves contributors who face the same efficiency of public goods provision when deciding about their contribution. The only difference between both conditions is that administrators in the corruption condition make an active decision for expropriation, whereas administrators in the control condition benefit passively from contributions. Consequently, our design identifies the motivational effect of corruption on the private provision of public goods and separates this effect from the mere inefficiency effect associated with corruption.
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Technical Details We conducted the experiment in the Laboratory for Experimental
Research Nuremberg (LERN). In total, 384 subjects participated in the experiment, 96
as administrators and 288 as contributors. The experiment took one hour, with an average payoff of 90.1 ECU. The average earnings, including the show-up fee of 4 Euro, were 13.01 Euro. We programmed the experiment with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and recruited subjects with ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) . Subjects were recruited from the subject pool at LERN without imposing any restrictions. Subjects solved control questions before the experiment and answered survey questions on individual charac-teristics and game-related issues after the experiment. We also informed subjects that we would send an e-mail that reports the total amounts transferred to the associations.
The Effect of Corruption on Voluntary Contributions
Out of the 48 administrators in the corruption condition, 38 decided for expropriation.
This provides us with observations on 114 contributors from the corruption condition matched to an expropriating administrator. We implemented the same distribution in the control condition and thus obtained another 114 contributors from 38 groups with a passive administrator receiving the additional compensation. In our main analysis, we do not consider contributors from groups in which administrators did not benefit from contributions, but we briefly report the results for this subsample at the end of this section. The sample for our main analysis thus comprises 228 observations from contributors matched to an administrator who benefited from contributions, either actively through expropriation or passively through the additional compensation.
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Our main result is that corruption impairs the private provision of public goods. In the control condition, subjects contributed 16.9% of their endowment. In contrast, subjects contributed only 11.7% of their endowment in the corruption condition. This 30.9% reduction in mean contributions is statistically significant (P = 0.039, MannWhitney U test).
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Figure 3 identifies how administrators deciding in favor of expropriation affect voluntary contributions to public goods. Given that the marginal impact of contributions on public goods provision is identical between conditions, the effect of corruption captured by our design is a response to the fact that an administrator has made an active decision for expropriation. We conclude that even if we control for differences in efficiency, contributors who are exposed to corrupt administrators are less inclined to behave prosocially (and are thus more likely to free-ride) in terms of voluntary 11 Figure A1 in the appendix summarizes our sample and shows the number of contributors conditional on administrators' decisions and the random draw.
12 See Panel A in Table A1 in the appendix for descriptive statistics.
contributions to public goods. experimentally-validated survey that survey measures of trust proxy for cooperation preferences (rather than for beliefs about others' cooperativeness). 13 Hence, comparing the responses to corruption between subjects with low vs. high levels of stated trust allows us to test whether the overall negative effect of corruption is driven by subjects with a weak or strong baseline preference for cooperation (or both). To study 13 Thöni et al. (2012) run a public goods experiment in the laboratory and find that the response to the trust question is a strong predictor of how much subjects contribute given their beliefs about others' contributions, but that it does not predict how much subjects believe other people will contribute. the interaction, we make use of subjects' responses to a survey question on generalized trust elicited after the experiment. Specifically, we asked subjects to respond to the statement 'Generally speaking, people can be trusted', with four response categories 'completely agree', 'agree', 'disagree', and 'completely disagree'. 14 To study the interaction between corruption and preferences for cooperation, we split the sample of contributors into cooperative types and non-cooperative types. Specifically, we categorize subjects as 'cooperative types' if they choose one of the first two categories ('completely agree' or 'agree') in response to the trust question, and as 'non-cooperative types' if they choose one of the last two categories ('disagree' or 'completely disagree'). This classifies 130 subjects as cooperative, and 98 as noncooperative. We then separately study how subjects with high and subjects with low preferences for cooperation respond to corruption. The subsample analysis assumes that survey responses to the trust question are unaffected by the treatment itself. Our data clearly support this assumption: the share of cooperative types in the control and the corruption condition is 59.7% and 54.4%, respectively. This difference in the share of cooperative types is not statistically significant (P = 0.42, Mann-Whitney U test).
Figure 5 demonstrates that differences in preferences for cooperation determine how subjects respond to corruption. 15 Three observations emerge. First, average contributions in the control condition are significantly higher for cooperative than for non-cooperative types (P < 0.01, Mann-Whitney U test). This finding mirrors the result reported by Thöni et al. (2012) and illustrates that a subject's response to the trust question indeed predicts voluntary contributions to public goods. Second, the left panel of Figure 5 shows a strong negative response to corruption among cooperative types: in the presence of expropriating administrators, subjects with a high baseline preference for cooperation reduce their contributions to the level of non-cooperative types. The difference between the average contribution of cooperative types in the control condition (20.8% of endowment) and the corruption condition (10.5%) is statistically significant (P < 0.001, Mann-Whitney U test). Third, the difference between 14 Hence, our survey question is a simplified version of the one used by the WVS and discussed by Thöni et al. (2012) and others, which is 'Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people? '. 15 See Panel B in Table A1 in the appendix for descriptive statistics.
average contributions of non-cooperative types in the control condition (11.2% of endowment) and contributions of non-cooperative types in the corruption condition (13.1%) is not significant (P = 0.32, Mann-Whitney U test). This means that in our context, subjects with a low baseline preference for cooperation do not contribute at all to the overall negative response of contributions to corruption.
The pronounced heterogeneity in the treatment response uncovered in Figure 5 suggests that the overall effect of corruption on voluntary contributions to public goods works through a specific channel: while in a world without corruption a stronger individual preference for cooperation translates into higher contributions to public goods, this tendency is lost in populations facing corrupt administrators. Hence, because corruption breaks the positive link between preferences for cooperation and actual cooperative behavior among citizens, it can be understood as a form of anti-social behavior.
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RESULT 2: The negative impact of corruption on voluntary contributions works through a specific channel: the presence of corrupt administrators breaks the positive link between preferences for cooperation among contributors and actual cooperative behavior.
We performed a number of checks to test the robustness and internal validity of our results. For instance, estimating the treatment effect using a linear regression and controlling for individual characteristics leaves all our results unchanged (see Table A2 in the appendix for details). The estimates suggest that corruption reduces contributions by 29.2% relative to the average contribution in the control condition.
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The effect is statistically significant and very close to the estimate of a 30.9% reduction based on a simple comparison of unconditional means. Table A2 also shows that our results are only marginally affected if we employ a Tobit specification, thereby accounting for the fact that contributions are censored at zero.
With 76 out of a total of 96 administrators benefiting from contributions, the sub- 16 The finding of heterogeneous responses regarding stated trust in others differentiates our work from the literature on the determinants of social capital. This literature has often used measures of interpersonal trust as the outcome of interest, and has argued that trust itself is a representation of concepts like prosociality or social capital (Putnam, 1993; Knack and Keefer, 1997) . 17 See Table A2 , column (1). The effect of corruption is −4.93. We compare this to the average baseline contribution of 16.9 in the control condition.
sample of contributors facing administrators who did not benefit from contributions amounts to only 30 contributors in each condition. Because our design aims at identifying the effects of expropriation and not on the effects of administrators forgoing options for rent extraction, we do not put much emphasis on the respective findings and only report these results for completeness. As documented in Table A3 Comparing mean contributions with and without the additional compensation scheme in the control condition, we find the difference to be not statistically different from zero (P = 0.243, Mann-Whitney U test). In the corruption condition, mean contributions differ significantly between exposure and no exposure to expropriation. As expected, contributions are higher if the administrator decided against expropriation (P = 0.080, Mann-Whitney U test).
Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that corruption reduces voluntary contributions to public goods. We design a simple one-shot contribution game that exposes subjects in a corruption condition to an expropriating administrator and compare contribution behavior to a control condition without corruption. Importantly, our design shuts down the efficiency effect resulting from administrators expropriating part of contributions, and hence identifies what we call the pure motivational effect of corruption on the private provision of public goods. The main result of our analysis is that corruption has severe negative consequences for voluntary contribution behavior: subjects matched to an expropriating administrator make much lower contributions compared to subjects in the control condition. We also show that this effect is entirely driven by subjects with a high baseline preference for cooperation. Absent corruption, this subgroup makes much higher contributions compared to subjects with a low preference for cooperating with others. However, in the presence of corrupt administrators, a higher preference for cooperation does no longer trigger higher contributions. Our work thus identifies a specific channel through which bureaucratic corruption diminishes prosocial behavior of citizens.
Our findings have important implications for assessing the social costs of corruption and related forms of bad governance. Most importantly, the negative impact on voluntary contributions amplifies the scarcity of public services that results from the direct effect of the bureaucracy's misuse of public funds. Besley and Ghatak (2006) have recently argued that access to public goods is an essential determinant of quality of life, in particular in developing countries. Corruption might thus be considered even more detrimental to development if we account for its often neglected impact on the private provision of public goods.
We leave for future research the question how the legitimacy of administrators affects individuals' responses to corruption. Based on related research on sanctioning mechanisms (Baldassarri and Grossman, 2011) , we conjecture that corruption by elected officials with a high legitimacy could have stronger effects on prosocial behavior than corruption by administrators or bureaucrats with relatively low legitimacy.
It also seems worthwhile to investigate intercultural differences in how prosocial behavior responds to corruption, thereby linking the discussion to the literature on how groups manage to maintain cooperation in the presence of free-riding incentives (Henrich et al., 2006; Herrmann et al., 2008) . The difference in means between low and high corruption is significant at the 1% level (P < 0.0001, n = 7716, Mann-Whitney U test). Error bars show the mean ± the standard error of the mean. The set of countries were both survey questions were asked comprises Algeria, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Yemen. Note: The figure shows mean contributions in the corruption and the control condition for individuals with a high stated baseline level of interpersonal trust (left panel) and individuals with low stated baseline trust (right panel). Subjects are categorized as 'cooperative' if they choose 'agree' or 'completely agree' in response to the statement 'Generally speaking, people can be trusted', and categorized as 'non-cooperative' if they choose 'disagree' or 'completely disagree'. For non-cooperative types, the difference in means between conditions is insignificant (P = 0.32, n = 98, Mann-Whitney U test). For cooperative types, the difference in means between conditions is significant at the 1% level (P = 0.0006), n = 130, Mann-Whitney U test). Error bars show the mean ± the standard error of the mean. The sample consists of all contributors who were matched to an administrator who benefited from contributions, either through active expropriation (corruption condition) or passively through the additional compensation (control condition). Panel A displays figures differentiated by condition. Panel B shows mean contributions by condition and baseline level of interpersonal trust. The trust measure comes from a survey conducted after the experiment. Subjects were asked to respond to the statement 'Generally speaking, people can be trusted', with response categories 'completely agree', 'agree', 'disagree', and 'completely disagree'. We categorize subjects as 'cooperative types' if they choose one of the first two categories, and as 'non-cooperative types' if they choose one of the last two categories. Note: The sample consists of all contributors who were matched to an administrator who benefited from contributions, either through active expropriation (corruption condition) or passively through the additional compensation (control condition). Column (1) shows the effect of corruption using a simple OLS regression. As 34.6% of observations are left-censored at zero, Column (2) reports the corresponding effect from a Tobit regression (there is no right-censoring because no subject contributed the full endowment). The Tobit estimate shown in Column (2) is the average partial effect of changing from the neutral condition to the corruption condition. Standard errors (robust for OLS, Delta Method for Tobit) are reported in parentheses. Both regressions account for subjects' gender, field of study (economics vs. other), and a dummy for experience in laboratory experiments. All results are robust to including further controls like subjects' age and more disaggregated dummies for field of study. In the survey conducted after the experiment, one subject stated that she was confused and did not understand how contributions would translate into funds going to the associations. If we exclude this subject, results become somewhat stronger: the OLS estimate becomes −5.40 * * , the Tobit estimate is −4.78 * * . Note: The sample consists of all contributors who were matched to an administrator who did not benefit from contributions, neither through active expropriation (corruption condition) nor passively through the additional compensation (control condition). The table shows mean contributions and standard deviations (in parentheses) by condition.
INSTRUCTIONS OF CORRUPTION AND CONTROL TREATMENTS (Control treatment instructions replace highlighted text with grey text in brackets)
Welcome to the experiment, we are grateful for your participation. Please read the instructions carefully.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. One of the experimenters will answer your questions. You are not allowed to communicate with other participants of the experiment. Please turn off your mobile phone. During the experiment it is not allowed to take notes. This is an experiment on economic decision making. You can earn money with your participation. You will receive 4 Euro as a participation fee. During the experiment you can earn additional money. Your additional earnings depend on your behavior and the behavior of the other participants. During the experiment, money will be displayed in ECU (Experimental Currency Units) with an exchange rate of 1 Euro = 10 ECU. Your entire earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the second part of the experiment.
Participants will neither be informed about the identity of other participants, nor about others' role in the experiment or earnings. The data will be analyzed anonymously.
EXPERIMENT
ROLES
Every participant is assigned a role, either contributor or administrator. The roles are randomly assigned at the beginning of the experiment and do not change during the experiment. All participants are treated equally in role assignment. Every participant will be informed about her role at the beginning of the experiment.
GROUPS
All participants are randomly assigned into independent groups. Each group consists of three contributors and one administrator. Groups remain the same throughout the entire experiment.
PROCEDURE
The experiment consists of six steps. You decide only once, there are no repetitions.
Step The administrator receives a fixed compensation of 100 ECU for the administration of payments.
STEP 2: SELECTION OF AN ORGANIZATION
All contributors select one organization as recipient of a possible payment. Contributors of the same group can select different organizations. Payments during the experiment will be transferred to the selected organizations.
All organizations provide services for students of the University of Erlangen-Nuremberg. In the following, you find a list with a brief description of the organizations' activities.
Organizations Activities
Fachschaftsinitiative ( The administrator decides actively on whether to expropriate 10% of the payments in addition to her fixed compensation or not (The compensation of the administrator includes a fixed component of 100 ECU and a variable component. She has no influence on the structure of her compensation. For the group, one of the following alternatives will be randomly selected with a certain probability):
Expropriation (Additional compensation): For the administration of payments, the administrator receives a fixed compensation of 100 ECU. The administrator decides actively to expropriate 10% of contributors' payments to the organizations in addition to her fixed compensation (and 10% of payments). Payments net of the subtracted 10% are doubled and transferred to the selected organizations. The organizations thus receive twice as much as the remaining payments.
No expropriation (No additional compensation): For the administration of payments, the administrator receives a fixed compensation of 100 ECU. The administrator decides actively not to expropriate 10% of contributors' payments to the organizations in addition to the fixed compensation. The entire payments are doubled and transferred to the selected organizations. The organizations thus receive twice as much as the payments.
STEP 3: INFORMATION ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATOR'S DECISION (ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION)
All contributors are informed about the decision of the administrator (whether the administrator receives an additional compensation or not).
STEP 4: PAYMENT TO ORGANIZATION
Out of her/his endowment, each contributor can pay an amount to the organization selected in step 2 (0 and 100 are also possible).
STEP 5: ADMINISTRATION OF PAYMENTS
The administrator assigns the payments made by contributors in her/his group to the selected organizations. A mechanism makes sure that when making the assignments, errors are precluded.
STEP 6: PAYOFF OF PARTICIPANTS AND ORGANIZATIONS
The payoffs of contributors, administrators and organizations are calculated as follows. For simplification, payments will be rounded to integer ECU amounts.
After the experiment, we will inform you about payments to the different organizations via e-mail. Please note that this may take some weeks. 
